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Statement of Jurisdiction
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order from the Fourth Judicial Court,
American Fork Department dated June 6, 2006. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2a-3(2)G").
Statement of Issues
/. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Hickory Kist fs motion for
summary judgment when issues of material fact existed?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Coulter &
Smith v. Russell 1999 UT App. 55,19, 976 P.2d 1218.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For Summary
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at oral argument on that Motion, by filing Objection to
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294) and by
filing the Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299).
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Miss Jex could not
recover under the first claim of business owner liability?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated on other grounds bv Campbell v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, and modified on other grounds.
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For Summary

Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299).
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Miss Jex could not
recover under the second claim of business owner liability?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869
P.2d at 936 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For SummaryJudgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299).
Statutory and constitutional Provisions
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are applicable to this case.
Statement of the Case
A. Nature of the Case, Course Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court
This case involves the claim of Donna Jex for injuries she received when she
slipped on the v/ood floor at Hickory ICist's store. Motions for summary judgment were
made by both parties. The honorable Judge Derek K. Pullan entered a final order granting
the defendants' motion on June 6, 2006. This timely appeal by the plaintiff followed.
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B. Statement of Facts
On January 26, 2004, there was new snow (R. at 290). James Fillmore, owner of
Hickory Kist Meat Snacks and Deli, came in the back door of the store at about 5:00 a.m.
(R. at 290). Mr. Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes with deep tread (R.
at 289). At about 6:30 or 7:00, after removing the snow and spreading ice melt at the
front part of the store, Mr. Fillmore walked through the front door of the store all the way
to the back to start cooking (R. at 290). Before any customers arrived, including Miss Jex
who was the first customer, Mr. Fillmore likely walked many times across the area where
Miss Jex was injured.
At about 5:30 a.m. Sharlene Barber, an employee of Hickory Kist, came into the
store (R. at 290). That day Sharlene was wearing Sketchers brand athletic shoes with
thick soles and deep tread (R. at 289). Sharlene usually turns the lights on, but cannot
remember turning them on that day (R. at 290). At about 7:00 a.m. Sharlene put mats on
the floor (R. at 290). Sharlene stated that prior to Jex's injury she and James Fillmore
were the only people in the area where the injury occurred (R. at 290). While Sharlene
testified that she knew the wood floor was slick when wet, she does not inspect for water
in the mornings and did not check for water the morning of the injury (R. at 290).
Further, because of her cooking duties and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that she
would have noticed a wet spot by chance (R. at 290).
Donna Jex came into Hickory Kist prior to 8:30 a.m. Miss Jex was the first
customer of the day and was wearing snow boots with new, but small tread (R at 290,
289, 202). The tread is so small that it is only visible on close inspection (R. at 202). As

Miss Jex entered the store she noticed that the lights in the store were dim, as if some of
the lights were not on (R. at 290). When Miss Jex reached the cash register she turned
right to go to the back of the store to make her order (R. at 289). As she turned Miss Jex
slipped on the wood floor due to a small puddle, about four inches in diameter (R. at
289). As a result of the fall Miss Jex suffered a broken wrist and injured her back.
Miss Jex's injury occurred about eight feet from the counter where employees
assist customers (R. at 290). When an employee is standing behind the counter, the
employee can easily see the area where the injury occurred (R. at 290).
On the day that Donna Jex was injured Hickory Kist failed to place mats on all
walking areas (R. at 289, 288). Mr. Fillmore decides where the floor mats will be placed
(R. at 288). While a mat had previously been placed over the area where Miss Jex fell,
there was no mat in this area on the day in question (R. at 288). Mr. Fillmore said he
decided to remove the mat because it was not "keeping water off the floor." His
reasoning was that there were two other mats before this one and they would collect the
water. So the one over the area where Miss Jex fell was unnecessary. (R. at 182-81).
Thus, because Mr. Fillmore chose to have the mat removed, Miss Jex stepped from a mat
onto a wet hardwood floor and slipped and fell.
After the injury Mr. Fillmore inspected the area where the injury took place and
found a small amount of water on Miss Jex's boots and on the floor (R. at 289). Although
Mr. Fillmore did not see any water on the floor prior to Miss Jex's injury, there is no
evidence that he inspected the floor. There were no warning signs telling Miss Jex that
the floor might be wet (R. at 289). When asked about what source the water came from
6

Mr. Fillmore stated that there were only two possible sources—his own shoes, or Miss
Jex's (R. at 289). While there was a Pepsi salesman that came in before Miss Jex's
accident (R. at 289), he only walked through the store once, and none of the store
employees list him as a possible source of the water.
It is undisputed that Hickory Kist did not have a formal policy for keeping their
floors clean from water and debris (R. at 288). The employees were not given any
instructions or formal training on inspecting the floor for water (R. at 288, 204). Mr.
Fillmore does not ever remember telling the employees to inspect the floor (R. at 178).
The written daytime checklist does not have anything on it about inspecting the floors.
(R. at 178). Hickory Kist has a written checklist with daytime instructions, but the list
does not include any instructions about inspecting the floor for water. Further, rather than
mopping up at various times throughout the day, Hickory Kist only has employees mop
the floor at the end of the day (R. at 288).
Miss Jex's broken wrist and injured back have made it very difficult to perform
her job as a part-time substitute teacher and to take care of everyday chores. Her income
is limited and she depends on others for help. She is a single, elderly lady, who is sixtynine years old and lives alone. While she used to teach computers efficiently, she now
has severe pain when she types. Carrying books to class and any other light lifting,
including house work such as vacuuming and mowing, is now extremely difficult and
painful.

Summary of Arguments
The trial court determined that Miss Jex could not recover under the first class of
liability (temporary condition) because neither James Fillmore nor his employees had
actual knowledge that the water was on the floor (R. at 284). However, this is a
misapplication of Utah law because owners can also be found liable under the temporary
condition theory if either the owner or his employees had constructive knowledge of the
water. In the present case the trial court judge acknowledged the viability of constructive
knowledge as an element of the claim, but failed to address the constructive knowledge
of James Fillmore and his employees. This failure constituted reversible error.
The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that Miss Jex could
not recover under the permanent condition theory of negligence because the trial court
failed to recognize Hickory Kist's wood flooring as an inherently dangerous condition.
The court also failed to recognize that a slip-and-fall was foreseeable to Hickory Kist in
light of the snowy weather conditions and the failure of Mr. Fillmore to place mats in all
areas of customer traffic.
In granting summary judgment the trial court erred because there are genuine
issues of material fact that need to be decided by a jury. There are at least three genuine
issues of material fact in this case that make summary judgment improper. The first issue
is who was responsible for putting the water on the floor. This issue is material to Miss
Jex's claim because if the water was created by Hickory Kist's employees, she can
recover under the temporary condition theory without proving actual or constructive
knowledge. The second issue is the length of time the water existed on the floor before
8

the injury. The evidence shows that the water on the floor of the defendant's store could
have existed anywhere from one second (if it came from Miss Jex) to over an hour (if it
came from Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore). The length of time the water existed is material to a
claim under the temporary condition theory because it determines whether or not Hickory
Kist should have known about the water. The third issue is whether or not the wood floor
is an inherently dangerous and foreseeable condition that Hickory Kist did not take
proper measures to protect customers against. This issue is material to Miss Jex's
recovery under the permanent condition theory and should have been decided by a jury
because it is a question of fact.
Duty to Marshal the Evidence
When appellants challenge findings of fact they must marshal the evidence. Utah
R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9). However, when a trial court's findings of fact deal only with
peripheral matters and do not go to the question of whether the plaintiff proved the
elements of his case, the only basis for determining whether or not a motion was properly
granted is a review of the conclusions of law. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985).
In the present case the trial judge made findings of fact. The trial judge accepted,
and Hickory Kist did not dispute, Miss Jex's statement of undisputed facts set forth in her
Motion for Summary Judgment. The only fact that set forth by Miss Jex that was not
found by the trail court was Hickory Kist's failure to keep its business in a reasonably
safe condition. In support of this requested finding, Miss Jex spent the money and time to
file get an affidavit of a certified safety professional who opined that defendant did not

reasonably protect customers from foreseeable danger (R at 163). Hickory Kist filed no
counter affidavit and did not request additional time to do so. Either Zurich Insurance
(Hickory Kist's insurer) didn't want to pay for an expert, could not find an expert, or
thought it didn't need an expert. In any event, Defendant relied on its own arguments and
allegations. Because Miss Jex is not challenging any part of the trial judge's "Findings of
Fact," and because defendant did not attempt to file an affidavit from an expert stating
that defendant did not breach the standard of care and that defendant did act reasonably to
protect customers from foreseeable danger, the marshalling requirement does not apply in
this case.
Argument
I.

The trial court erred in its decision that Jex could not recover under
temporary condition class of storeowner negligence because Hickory
Kist had constructive knowledge of the water and because the water
was created by the owner of Hickory Kist or one of his employees.

The first class of recovery against a business owner for a slip-and-fall involves a
temporary condition such as a slippery substance on a floor. Schnuphase v. Storehouse
Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). There are two types of recovery under the first
class of liability. Because both types of recovery have different criteria they will be
discussed separately. The first type occurs when it is unknown who created the unsafe
condition. The second type occurs when the unsafe condition is created by a store owner
or one of his employees.
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Condition Created From an Unknown Source
For a plaintiff to recover when it is unknown how the unsafe condition was created
the plaintiff must prove two things. First, the plaintiff must show that the store owner or
his employees had knowledge of the unsafe condition. Id. Second, the plaintiff must show
that the store owner or his employees had adequate time to remedy the condition. Id.
The knowledge requirement is satisfied if the owner or his employees had either
actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Id. Constructive knowledge
exists if the unsafe condition existed for a long enough time that the owner or employees
should have discovered it. Id.
Turning to Utah case law, plaintiffs have been hindered by the lack of clear
criteria determining constructive knowledge. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d
477 (Utah 1955) (Plaintiff slipped and fell on water at the defendant's coffee shop. There
was no evidence as to who spilled the water, or how long the water had been there before
the plaintiff slipped on it); Koer v. May fair Mkts, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (Plaintiff
slipped and fell on a grape in the defendant's store. There was no evdience put on by the
plaintiff to show who had put the grape on the floor or how long it might have been
there.); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc.. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) (Plaintiff slipped
on cottage cheese in the defendant's store. There was no evidence offered by the plaintiff
to show how long the cottage cheese had been there and no one had seen cottage cheese
on the floor prior to the incident.). While it is clear from these four cases that courts will
not find constructive knowledge from mere allegations by the plaintiff, there are no
specific requirements set forth for proving constructive knowledge. The only clear rule

set out so far is that the existence of an unsafe condition for two to four minutes is not
long enough to give a business owner constructive knowledge. See Schnuphase% 918 P.2d
at 478.
While Utah cases have not set forth clear criteria for determining when
constructive notice should be imputed, other jurisdictions have. Constructive knowledge
should be imputed on a case-by-case basis. Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690, 692
(Colo. 1967). While the length of time a condition existed is one of the most important
factors, the following factors must also be considered: nature of the condition, its
foreseeable consequences, the means and opportunities of discovering it, the diligence
required to discover and correct it, and the foresight which a person of ordinary prudence
would have exercised under similar circumstances. Id.
In addition, other jurisdictions charge a store owner with constructive knowledge
when an employee of the owner was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition
and could have easily seen the substance. Banks v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 161 S.E.2d366,
368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). "When it is alleged that an employee is in the immediate area of
the dangerous condition and has the means and opportunity to discover the same, it then
becomes a question for the jury whether the defendant in the exercise of due care should
have discovered and either warned the plaintiff or corrected the alleged hazard." Id. The
unsafe condition does not have to exist for a specific period of time for this type of
constructive knowledge to exist. Id.
Utah courts must adopt similar criteria for determining when constructive
knowledge exists because without such requirements there is an incentive for business
12

owners to ignore unsafe conditions. If the law does not change, recovery for temporary
unsafe conditions that are created by an unknown source, becomes almost impossible
because actual knowledge is extremely difficult to prove. Currently there are no Utah
cases of record in which a court ruled that the plaintiff proved constructive knowledge. If
Utah law continues to remain unclear on what constitutes constructive knowledge,
plaintiffs will be unable to prove such knowledge and business owners will have an
incentive to implement unsafe policies such as telling their employees not to check for
water so that they can avoid actual knowledge. Such practices would greatly harm the
public interest and health. The law must set reasonable requirements for proving
constructive knowledge so that businesses maintain their premises in a reasonably safe
manner.
Turning to the present case, the trial court ruled that Miss Jex could not recover
under the first theory of liability because it was uncontested that neither Hickory Kist nor
its employees had actual knowledge of the water (R. at 284). However, the trial court
failed to address Miss Jex's proof of constructive knowledge and in doing so misapplied
Utah law which allows for recovery when either actual or constructive knowledge exists.
The evidence produced in this case shows that Hickory Kist had a reasonable time
to discover the water, and thus, constructive knowledge should be imputed. The shoes of
Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would have easily
become lodged in the deep grooves of their shoes and would have been tracked onto the
wood floor when they entered the store. Further, Mr. Fillmore had been outside shoveling
the snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling would have

required Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times whereas Miss Jex
walked into the store after snow removal had occurred (R. at 290). Further, the amount of
time needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in the one second it
took Miss Jex to step from the mat onto the wood floor. Also, with the small tread on
Miss Jex's shoes, any traces of water and snow would almost certainly been removed
from her shoes by the time she reached the wood floor because she walked on
approximately twenty five feet of mats before she arrived at the counter (See R. at 289).
On the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene walked
through the front of the store (See R. at 290). When taken in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the facts show that either Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore tracked in the snow that
caused the water on the floor. Thus, the water was very likely on the floor for 1-2 hours
before Miss Jex slipped on it.
The length of time the water was on the floor is a very important factor in
determining if the water should have been discovered by Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene.
However, length of time must be considered in conjunction with the other case specific
factors as set out by Colorado's Supreme Court—first, nature of the condition; second, its
foreseeable consequences; third, the means and opportunities of discovering it; fourth, the
diligence required to discover and correct it; and fifth, the foresight which a person of
ordinary prudence would have exercised under similar circumstances.
In the present case, the five factors show that even if the water had existed for a
shorter period than it did, the water should have been discovered and remedied by either
Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore. First, the nature of water on a wood floor is very dangerous.
14

Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene testified they knew the floor was slippery when wet (R. at
289). Next, the consequences of water on a wood floor are severe. The harm suffered in
this case was a broken wrist and a back injury. Third, Hickory Kist is a small store that
does not get a lot of traffic. The area of the store is not large and thus, it is easy to inspect
the floor frequently. It would not be unreasonable for Hickory Kist to have a policy in
place requiring employees to check their small floor for water and other debris every
thirty minutes and certainly before customers come in the morning. This is especially true
when employees with deep-treaded shoes have been traipsing around in the snow and
then come inside before mats have been set out for them to wipe their feet on. Fourth, the
water was in a place easily visible to Hickory Kist's employee, Sharlene. The water was
only eight feet away from where Sharlene was performing her responsibilities. The water
was in a plainly visible, un-obscure spot and would have taken little effort to discover.
Also, because Hickory Kist had not opened for the day, there would have been no
customers to obstruct Sharlene's view of the floor. Fifth, with snowy weather conditions,
a person of ordinary prudence would have had the foresight to know that water and snow
would be tracked in. Such a person would have put up warning signs, covered all wood
areas where customers walk with mats, and inspected the premise before opening for the
day.
Constructive knowledge should also be imputed on Hickory Kist according to the
requirements set out by the Georgia Supreme Court (an employee in the immediate
vicinity that has the means and opportunity to see the condition.) Sharlene was the
Hickory Kist employee in the immediate area of the water, and she had the means and

opportunity to discover it. For about an hour Sharlene was only eight feet away from the
water. If she had merely glanced over the floor area she would have seen the water.
Again, Hickory Kist had not opened for the day and thus, there would have been no
customers to obstruct Sharlene's view. In Lend Lease Transportation v. McBride Lend
Lease's employee was almost twice as far from the dangerous condition as Sharlene.
Lend Lease Transportation Company v. McBride* 315 S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984). Yet the jury determined that the defendant's employee was in the immediate
vicinity of the condition and could have easily seen the condition. Id.
Unlike previous Utah cases, Miss Jex has provided sufficient circumstantial
evidence showing how long the water was on the floor before she slipped on it. This case
is distinguishable from previous Utah cases such as Koer, Lindsay, and Allen, because
Miss Jex, unlike previous plaintiffs, provided evidence of how long the dangerous
condition existed. Further, this case is distinguishable from Schnuphase because Miss Jex
was the first customer in the store, and the water was on Hickory Kist's floor much
longer than two to four minutes.
In short, summary judgment in favor of Hickory Kist was improper because the
trial court misapplied Utah slip-and-fall law by not considering the constructive
knowledge of Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. Utah law on constructive knowledge is sparse
and this Court should adopt the criteria of surrounding jurisdictions in order to promote
safe practices among businesses. The evidence shows that Hickory Kist had constructive
knowledge of the water because the water was present for at least an hour, was
dangerous, could have easily been discovered, and could have easily been removed.
16

While Hickory Kist is not an insurer of its patron's safety, Hickory Kist purchased an
insurance policy from Zurich insurance to pay for accidents like this where negligent acts
result in injury to patrons.
Condition Created by the Defendant or His Employee
Generally it must be shown that the owner of a business knew, or should have
known, of the existence of a dangerous condition in order for the business to be liable
under the first theory of liability. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624
(UtahCt. App. 1991). However, if the condition was created by the defendant himself or
his agents or employees, the plaintiff does not have to prove actual or constructive
knowledge to recover. Id,
If there is evidence showing that a defendant created the dangerous condition on
which a plaintiff falls, summary judgment for defendant is improper because it is a
question of fact for the jury to decide who created the dangerous condition. In Silcox v.
Skaggs Alpha Beta Miss Silcox slipped on a puddle of water in the defendant's store.
Silcox v. Skazes Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Near the
accident there was a cart stocked with ice that was melting. Id. Miss Silcox produced
evidence that the cart stacked with ice was the type of cart usually used by the
defendant's employees and not by customers. Id at 624-25. The defendant filed for
summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 624. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed stating that summary judgment was improper because Miss Silcox
had produced some evidence from which a jury could infer that the unsafe condition was
created by an employee. Id. at 625.

In the present case the trial court erred in determining that Miss Jex could not
recover under the first theory of liability because it failed to apply the law set forth in the
Silcox case.
Because there is ample evidence to show that the water was created by Hickory
Kist's employees, (see pg 12-13 supra) the trial court erred in determining Miss Jex
could not recover under the first class of liability. In Silcox the only circumstantial
evidence offered by the plaintiff was the type of cart that the melting ice had come from,
yet this Court considered that sufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion. Miss
Jex has much more evidence than the plaintiff in Silcox and thus, summary judgment
should be overturned. The trial court did not address the applicable law as set forth in the
Silcox case for when a temporary condition is created by the defendant.
II.

The trial court erred in determining that Jex could not recover under
the permanent condition theory of slip-and-fall liability.

When a business's method of operation creates a situation where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, they are liable
for injures resulting from the dangerous condition. Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc.. 841 P.2d
1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). As long as the condition causing the injury was
inherently dangerous and foreseeable, then the business owner is liable. Id. The type of
flooring a store uses can be an inherently dangerous condition. DeWeese v. J.C. Penney
Co., 297 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1956). If an inherently dangerous condition is employed the
business must discharge their duty of reasonable care by employing safety measures that
will protect customers from the risk of injury that the condition creates. Canfield. 841
18

P.2dat 1227. To recover under this theory a plaintiff does not have to prove notice of the
condition because notice is presumed. Id at 1226.
In DeWeese v. J.C. Penney the court concluded that, since the defendants knew
their floor surfacing was slippery when wet, the only remaining question was whether the
defendant discharged its duty to use reasonable diligence to protect its customers against
the surfacing. DeWeese, 297 P.2d at 901. The court concluded that reasonable minds
could find that the defendant had failed to employ proper safety measures in light of the
weather conditions. Id.
In Canfield v. Albertsons, Albertsons sold lettuce that did not have the wilted outer
leaves removed. Canfield, 841 p.2d at 1225. It thus put out empty boxes for customers to
put the wilted leaves in. Id. The court determined that these facts, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that this method of selling and displaying lettuce
leaves was inherently dangerous. Id. at 1227. The court further concluded this method of
operation made it foreseeable that lettuce leaves would be left on the floor and that
customers could slip on them. Id. Given Albertsons chosen method of operation, the
critical question was whether or not Albertsons had done what was reasonably necessary
to protect its customers from injuries that would likely be caused by its chosen method of
selling and displaying lettuce. Id. "Each determination of whether the protective
measures taken were reasonable is fact sensitive.. . In any event, the factfinder must
determine whether the storeowner's vigilance in protecting against the condition or
hazard was commensurate with the risk created by the method of operation/' Id. The
court decided that since Albertsons did not have mats and because the plaintiff

challenged Albertsons' assertion that it had cleaned the area shortly before her fall, there
was a question of fact for the jury and summary judgment was not proper. Id.
In the present case the trial court concluded that there was no evidence that
Hickory Kist chose a method of operation that created an inherently dangerous condition
or that the condition was foreseeable (R. at 282). However, the trial court erred in
making this conclusion. It is undisputed that wood flooring was used in the defendants'
store (R. at 215). It is also undisputed that Mr. Fillmore knew the floor was slick when
wet (R. at 289), and yet, on a snowy day, he failed to direct employees to put mats in all
areas of customer traffic (R. at 288). Just like the defendant in DeWesse, Hickory Kist
chose to employ a floor surfacing that was inherently dangerous when wet.
Due to the snowy weather conditions a slip-and-fall was foreseeable. On the day
of the accident James Fillmore and his employee Sharlene knew that it was snowing
outside (R. at 210, 290). They had seen the snow and knew it would be tracked in. Mr.
Fillmore had even shoveled snow off of his store's premises (R. at 290, 224). These facts,
when taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the inherently dangerous
condition (the wet wood floor) was foreseeable to Hickory Kist. Thus, the inherently
dangerous and foreseeable elements are met.
The essential question thus becomes whether or not Hickory Kist did what was
reasonably necessary to protect customers from wet wood flooring. The undisputed facts
show that Hickory Kist did not meet this requirement. Hickory Kist had no formal
policies in place for cleaning, sweeping, and checking its floors throughout the day (R. at
179-78). While Mr. Fillmore testified that keeping the floors clean was an important
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issue, there were no scheduled floor checks or sweepings during the day (R. at 179-78).
There was a daily checklist of jobs, but the checklist did not include inspecting the floors
(R. at 178). Further, Hickory Kist did not meet its duty of reasonable care because it
failed to place mats throughout all areas of customer traffic and also failed to inspect for
water before opening the store to customers (See R. at 288). On the day in question, when
it was foreseeable that snow would be tracked in, there was no mat where Miss Jex
slipped (R. at 288), yet it was an area where customers frequently stepped and an area
where a rug had once been placed and then removed because, in the opinion of Mr.
Fillmore, it would not keep water off the floor. Taken in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, these facts show that Hickory Kist did not take the necessary steps to guard
against the inherently dangerous condition (wood flooring) that it chose to employ. This
failure is a breach of Hickory Kist's duty to keeps its premises reasonably safe.
While it is highly unlikely that Mrs. Jex brought the water in (her shoes could not
carry enough snow to create a four inch puddle and any snow she may have brought in
would not have melted fast enough to create the puddle) assuming she did, Hickory Kist
is still responsible for the injuries she sustained. When a store creates an inherently
dangerous condition, it is responsible for conditions created by third parties. Thus, since
Hickory Kist used wood flooring it is responsible for the slippery surface no matter who
tracked the water in or when it was tracked in. The only relief from liability would be if
Hickory Kist used reasonable precautions to protect customers from slipping on the wet
wood floor; Hickory Kist failed to meet this burden.

III.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the
defendants because this case involves issues of material fact that
cannot be decided in summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only in very limited circumstances. For
summary judgment to be appropriate the facts of a case must be undisputed and there
must be only one conclusion that can be drawn from the facts. Can field v. Albertsons.
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Summary judgment should be granted
with extreme caution where the negligence of a property owner is alleged. Id. Usually
the issue of breach of the standard of care is a question of fact that the jury must decide.
Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, 871 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When the standard
of care required is reasonable care under the circumstances, the standard of care cannot
be determined as a matter of law because the reasonableness of the circumstances is a
question of fact for the jury. Id.
When a trial court determines that there were no genuine issues of material fact the
reviewing court does not defer to the trial courts determination, but reviews the facts and
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Canfield, 841 P.2dat 1226.
With respect to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Miss Jex was the non-moving
party, so all facts and inferences should be resolved in her favor.
In the present case there are at least three genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment. First, who was the source of the water that Donna Jex
slipped on; second, did the water exist for a long enough time that constructive notice
should have been imputed on Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene; and third, was the wood floor a
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foreseeable, inherently dangerous condition of which Hickory Kist failed to use
reasonable measures to guard customers against?
Source of Water
If a plaintiff produces evidence, even circumstantial evidence, that an unsafe
condition was created by a defendant or his employees then summary judgment is
improper. Silcox v. Skages Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In
the Silcox case Miss Silcox slipped on a puddle of water in the defendant's store. Id. at
624. Near the accident there was a cart stocked with ice that was melting. Id. Miss Silcox
produced evidence (in the form of a deposition) that the cart stacked with ice was the type
of cart used by the defendant's employees and not by customers. Id at 624-25. The
defendant filed for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 624.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and determined that
summary judgment was improper because Miss Silcox had produced some evidence from
which a jury could infer that water was created by an employee. The court reasoned that
"It is for the jury to decide, even if only as a matter of inference, whether one of
defendants' employees created the risk of harm, or whether a phantom shopper given to
moving merchandise about the store on a cart intended only for the use of store
personnel, was responsible for the plaintiffs injuries." Id. at 625.
Turning to the present case, according to Hickory Kist, there are three people that
could have tracked in the water—Donna Jex, Sharlene, and Mr. Fillmore. While the facts
about what each of these people did and how long they were in the area of injury prior to

the injury is undisputed, summary judgment was improper because more than one
conclusion can be drawn from the facts.
Miss Jex has produced more than enough evidence from which a jury could infer
that the water she slipped on was created by either Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. First, the
shoes of Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would have
easily become lodged in the deep grooves and would have been tracked onto the wood
floor when they entered the store. Further, Mr. Fillmore had been outside shoveling the
snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling would have required
Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times; whereas, Miss Jex walked
into the store after snow removal had occurred (See R. at 290). Next, the amount of time
needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in the one second it took
Miss Jex to step from the mat onto the wood floor. Also, with Miss Jex's small tread, any
traces of water and snow would have likely been removed from her shoes by the time she
reached the wood floor because the 25 feet of mats she had to walk on before she arrived
at the counter would have wiped almost all the water off her shoes (See R. at 289). On
the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore walked through the front of the
store because Sharlene did not put them out until about 7:00 and Mr. Fillmore had come
through at about 6:30 (R. at 290).
The foregoing facts are evidence from which a jury could conclude that Mr.
Fillmore or Sharlene created the water that Miss Jex slipped on. In the Silcox case the
only fact showing that the water was created by the defendant's employee was the type of
cart the ice was in. However, this was enough to preclude summary judgment. In the
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present case Miss Jex produced five times the facts that Miss Silcox did. Such evidence
precludes summary judgment and creates genuine issues of material fact that must be
decided by a jury.
Length of Time
If a plaintiff produces evidence that shows how long a condition may have existed,
the question of whether or not the defendant should have discovered and remedied the
condition is a question of fact for the jury that precludes summary judgment.
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d 476, 478-79.
While it is undisputed that neither Sharlene nor Mr. Fillmore knew about the water
on the floor, there is a question of fact as to whether they should have knowft about the
water on the floor. It is for a jury to decide, in light of all the surrounding circumstances,
whether or not the water was there for a long enough time that some Hickory Kist
employee should have seen and removed it.
This case is distinguishable from previous Utah cases (such as Allen, Koer, and
Lindsay, supra) where Utah courts determined that summary judgment was proper due to
the lack of evidence showing how the dangerous condition was created, when it was
created, and whether or not it should have been discovered. In the previous slip-and-fall
cases plaintiffs have not produced any evidence to show how long a condition existed on
the floor. It is undisputed that Miss Jex was Hickory Kist's first customer on the day of
the accident and entered the store just prior to 8:30. The only other people who had been
in the store were Mr. Fillmore, his employee Sharlene, and the Pepsi salesman. Further,
Mr. Fillmore testified that the watc* either came from his or Miss Jex's shoes. As

previously discussed the time needed for the snow to melt into a four inch puddle would
not have taken place in the second it took Miss Jex to step from the matt to the wood
floor. Thus, most likely the water came from Mr. Fillmore. Having come from Mr.
Fillmore the water would have been there since approximately 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. While
the facts are not clear cut, they preclude summary judgment because it is for a jury to
decide which conclusion to draw from them. The foregoing evidence is enough to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Inherent Danger and Forseeability
When a defendant chooses to employ an inherently dangerous, permanent
condition there is a question of fact for the jury to decide whether or not the defendant
took reasonable precautions to guard against the condition that it created. Canfield* 841
P.2d 1224, 1227. In Canfield v. Albertsons the trial court determined as a matter of law
that Albertson's action negated any negligence on its part. The Utah Court of Appeals
determined that this was error because a determination of reasonableness and negligence
should be left to the jury. Id.
In the present case there is a question of fact as to whether or not Hickory Kist
employed reasonable measures to protect against the inherently dangerous wood floor. It
had been snowing for a long enough time that the defendant should have employed all of
its safety measures. While Mr. Fillmore employed some of the store's safety measures by
putting out non-skid mats, he failed to cover all areas of customer traffic (R. at 288). Mr.
Fillmore had previously placed mats in the area where Miss Jex fell. However, on the
occasion in question there were no mats to guard against the slippery nature of the wood
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flooring (See R. at 288). This act fell below the standard of care required of Mr. Fillmore
to keep his business reasonably safe. Additionally, Hickory Kist failed to employ
adequate measures for cleaning and inspecting their floor. Mr. Fillmore testified that
there were no formal procedures for checking the floor (R. at 179-78).
In short summary judgment was improper due to at least three genuine issues of
material fact that need to be determined by a jury: First, who tracked the water onto the
floor; second, how long the water was on the floor; and third, whether Hickory Kist took
reasonable precautions to guard against the inherently dangerous condition it chose to
employ.
IV.

The trial court erred in failing to grant Miss Jex's Motion for
Summary Judgment because the evidence she presented established a
duty and a breach of that duty by Hickory Kist.

Summary judgment is proper when the standard of care owed by the defendant can
be determined as a matter of law. Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 575
(Utah App. 1994). The circumstances of the case must simply show that reasonable
minds can draw only one conclusion about the defendant's negligence. Id. When a
motion for summary judgment is made an adverse party cannot rest upon the mere
allegations or denials made in pleadings. Brigham Truck and Implement Co. v. Fridal,
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987). An adverse party must, by affidavits or other means,
set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.
In the present case Miss Jex offered the testimony of expert witness Charles
Haines in the form of an affidavit in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr.

Haines is a certified safety professional (R. at 163). He testified that Hickory Kist and its
owners did not exercise ordinary care to keep their premises in a reasonably safe
condition for customers (R. at 163). Mr. Haines further testified that the operation
methods of Hickory Kist were defective in at least five main ways. First, John Fillmore
should have inspected the area where Miss Jex slipped before going back to cook because
he knew that he had been spreading ice melt and could have tracked in snow (R. at 16261, 159). Second, because Hickory Kist and its owners knew the floor was slippery when
wet, there should have been mats in all walking areas (R. at 162-61). Third, Hickory Kist
employees should have been instructed to inspect the floor after each person entered the
building on a snowy day (R. at 162-61). Fourth, Hickory Kist should have had written
instructions and a daily check list regarding caring for their floor, especially on days with
poor weather conditions (R. at 160-59). While the owners of Hickory Kist said that their
employees used common sense when deciding when and how they would clean the
floors, Mr. Haines testified that common sense is not enough (R. at 160). There must be
specific instructions and guidelines. Fifth, when it was known that water would be
tracked into the business Hickory Kist and its owners should have put an A-frame out and
a sign warning that the floor was slippery when wet (R. at 160).
There is no evidence in the record of any counter evidence filed by Hickory Kist
to establish a standard of care different from the one ascertained by Mr. Haines. In
Hickory Kist's Reply Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment it is not argued that Mr. Haines did not articulate the correct standard of care
owed to Miss Jex, rather the motion argues that the defects in the standard of care were
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not foreseeable or inherently dangerous (R. at 244). The standard of reasonable care itself
is not contested (See R. at 244). When Miss Jex filed for summary judgment, Hickory
Kist could no longer rely on the denials made in its answer. Hickory Kist had to produce
evidence showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact that needed to be
decided by a jury. However, Hickory Kist failed in this regard. Whether Hickory Kist
chose not to seek expert testimony on the standard or care, or could not find an expert
that would testify on their behalf, the result is the same—Hickory Kist and its owners
failed to establish evidence showing that their conduct was reasonable. Thus, summary
judgment should be granted in favor of Miss Jex under the permanent condition theory of
storeowner liability because Hickory Kist has failed to counter the evidence produced by
Miss Jex showing that its precautions were not reasonable in light of the inherently
dangerous condition in chose to employ.
While the trial judge found that Hickory Kist employees are told that if they see
something on the floor to drop what they are doing and pick it up (R. at 288), this does
not show reasonableness because Hickory Kist has no affidavit from an expert saying it is
a reasonably safe practice under the circumstances. In light of Miss Jex's expert testifying
that common sense is not enough and that there must be some inspection policy (R at
160-161) there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Hickory
Kist's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Hickory Kist determined that the
case was ripe for decision when it filed its Motion for Summary Judgment following
written discovery and depositions of witnesses. If Hickory Kist needed more time to

counter Miss Jex's motion and expert affidavit, it should have requested it under Rule 56
(f); however, Hickory Kist chose not to.
By presenting expert witness testimony on the standard of care required by
Hickory Kist, Miss Jex made a prima facie showing of duty and breach. Duty was proven
by the expert's testimony and it is undisputed that Hickory Kist did not comply with the
standard of care as set forth by Mr. Haines. The burden then shifted to Hickory Kist to
refute the expert testimony or prove otherwise. Because Hickory Kist and its owners did
not counter Mr. Haines's testimony, they did not meet their burden of proof and partial
summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Miss Jex on the issues of duty
and breach.
Conclusion
Due to 1he trial court's errors in applying Utah law and awarding summary
judgment to the defendants when there were issues of material fact, this Court should
remand the case to the trial court. Miss Jex has provided sufficient ev:dence of
constructive knowledge, inherent danger, and foreseeability to overcome a summary
judgment ruling. Additionally Miss Jex should have partial summary judgment granted in
her favor on the issues of duty and breach due to Hickory Kist's mere denials and failure
to provide counter evidence on either issue.
DATED this
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day of November, 2006

Denton M. Hatch
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DONNA JEX

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Case Nc. 050100121

JRA. INC. dba HICKORY KIST DELI. JAMES
FILLMORE and ANGELA FILLMORE.

Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. On
April 5, 2006, the Court heard oral argument. The Plaintiff Donna Jex was represented by Mr. Denton
M. Hatch. The Defendants JRA, INC, dba Hickory Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore
("Defendants*' or "Hickory Kist") were represented by Mr. Michael L. Ford.

II;QI

After carefully considering the arguments and the law presented, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the morning of January 26. 2004, there was new snow on the ground. James Fillmore, owner
of Hickory Kist, arrived at work around 5:00 a.m. and entered through the back door. After
removing snow and spreading ice melt in front of the store, he walked in the front door and
walked to the back of the store to begin cooking. This occurred around 6:30 or 7:00 a.m.
An employee of Hickory Kist, Sharlene Barber, entered the store around 5:30 a.m. Around 7:00
a.m. she placed mats on the floor.
As part of her daily routine in opening the store, Barber turns on the lights, but cannot
specifically remember turning on the lights that morning.
Barber believes that only she and Fillmore were in the area where the accident occurred before
the Plaintiff.
Barber stated that there is never water on the floor in the mornings. She did not inspect for water
and never has inspected for water in the morning. Because of her cooking and other
responsibilities, it is unlikely she would have noticed water on the floor by chance.
Barber was working behind the front counter at the time of the accident. The place where the
accident occurred is about 8 feet in front of the counter. Standing behind the counter, one can
see the place where the accident occurred.
Plaintiff Donna Jex came into the store prior to 8:30 a.m. and was the first customer that day.
When Jex entered the store, the lights were dim as if some had not been turned on.
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Before Jex entered that morning, a Pepsi salesman had come in and walked to the back of the
store.
When a person comes into the front door of the store, he or she walks across about 25 feet of
mats before he or she arrives at the cash register. With the cash register on the left, the person
can step off the mats to go to the back of the store on the hardwood floor.
When Jex reached the area of the cash register, she turned to the right to go to the back of the
store. She intended to make a large order and saw no one at the front counter. As she turned,
she slipped on the floor.
As she was falling, Jex saw a puddle of water about 4 inches in diameter on the floor which
caused her to fall.
While Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the accident that morning, he speculated that the
water either came from his shoes or Jex's shoes. After the accident he inspected the area and
found a small amount of water on Jex's boots and on the floor. He opined that there was a 90%
chance the water came from Jex's shoes.
Jex was wearing boots with new, but small, tread.
Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes. Barber was wearing Skechers brand shoes
with thick soles.
The owners of the store knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes, the hardwood floor
was slippery when wet.
There we-e no wiming signs that the floor is slippery when wet.
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17.

There were no mats in the aisle areas. Fillmore decides where to place the mats. He had
previously placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred, but a mat was not there at the
time of the accident.

18.

Employees were not given formal instruction or training on inspecting the floors. However,
keeping floors clean and water free is an important issue. Employees are instructed that if there
is something on the floor, to drop what they are doing and take care of the floor. Employees
wipe the tables throughout the day and ensure that everything is in proper order for customers.

19.

The store floors are cleaned at night after the store is closed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and

that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving the elements of his or her cause
of action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex
Corn v Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986).
A store owner "is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall." Merino v.
Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478
(Utah 1996) (quoting Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968). Accordingly,
4
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the Utah Supreme Court has "recognized only two legal theories under which a plaintiff may recover
against a business owner for injuries arising from a siip-and-fall accident." Id.
The first theory involves unsafe conditions of a temporary nature. The store owner must have
either actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition:
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery
substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this class of cases it
is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is,
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Schuphase. 918P.2dat478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms. Inc.. 533 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah
1975). The second theory involves unsafe conditions of a permanent nature and is based on the store
owner creating the hazardous condition:
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the
structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of
use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible.
In such circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it,"
he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary.
Schuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah
1975).
Where a store owner's method of operation creates an unsafe condition, the condition must have
been foreseeable and inherently dangerous. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479; see also, Long v. Smith Food
Kinu Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973) (essential element in method of operation claims is that
condition created by defendant is of such character that defendant has or should have notice of inherently
dangerous condition). For purposes of analysis, method of operation claims are treated as being a
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permanent condition. Id.
DECISION
Temporary Condition
Case law is clear that where an unsafe condition is temporary, the store owner must have had
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, and had time to remedy it. A review of the case law
applying the temporary condition theory is instructive.
In Lindsav v. Eccles Hotel Company, 282 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), the plaintiff slipped in a small
quantity of water on the floor of a coffee shop. Evidence indicated that a waitress had delivered water to
plaintiff and her companion. However, the court found there was no evidence whether the waitress, the
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons spilled water, when it was spilled, or whether management
knew of its existence. The court ruled that "[u]nder such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to
speculate that the defendant was negligent."
In Koer v. Mavfair Vlarkets, 43 1 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), the plaintiff slipped on a grape in
defendant's store. There was no evidence to show the store knew or should have known of any
hazardous condition, or that it had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition.
In Lone v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973), the store was giving away small
samples of pumpkin pie topped with whipped cream. Plaintiff slipped on one of the pieces of pumpkin
pie. There was no evidence that a store employee or anyone else saw pie on floor prior to accident.
Plaintiff argued that the manner in which the samples were distributed was inherently dangerous because
of the likelihood that the slippery substance would be dropped on the floor. The court found that the
defendant did not have notice that the foreign substance was on the floor for sufficient time that in due

<

U<i8b

care it should have been removed. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that giving away samples of
pie was inherently dangerous.
In Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff slipped on
cottage cheese that was being given out as a sample. Neither the plaintiff, his wife, nor any of the store
personnel saw cottage cheese on the floor prior to the accident. The only way to determine how it got
there and for how long it had been on the floor was by inference and conjecture. Id. at 175. The plaintiff
argued that the method by which the store handed out the cottage cheese made it foreseeable that
customers would spill it on the floor. The court summarily ruled that there was i;no showing of any
dangerous condition of a permanent nature." Id. at 177.
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the plaintiff slipped on a scoop
of ice cream that another customer had dropped. The plaintiff claimed the store was negligent for not
•taking adequate precautionary measures to prevent or warn of such hazards. The court ruled that there
was "no evidence or any basis from which a fair inference could be drawn that Storehouse Markets
should have realized that there was ice cream on the floor or that it had the opportunity to remove it."
Id. at 478. Plaintiff relied on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) to argue
that the store's method of operation created a situation where it was reasonably foreseeable that the
expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous condition or defect. The court distinguished
Canfield and ruled that the plaintiff had not produced evidence of foreseeability of an inherently
dangerous condition. Id. at 479. See below.
Finally, in Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff slipped on a kiwi,
and a year later slipped on a jalapeno at the same store. The court found that the case did not involve

"an unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semi-permanent, nature....There is no testimony that the
floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable debris...In short, this is a case arising from an
unsafe condition of a temporary nature/' Id. at 468. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence that
Albertsons knew or should have known of the presence of the kiwi or jalapeno.
Plaintiff cannot recover under the first theory of liability. It is undisputed that no store employee
had actual knowledge of water on the floor. Hickory Kist cleaned the floors at night after the store
closed. Water did not collect or pool in the area of the accident that would suggest the area was
frequently wet. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not see water on the floor before she slipped. "Thus
the only way to determine how it got there, or how long it had been there, is by inference and
conjecture." Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 175 (Utah 1975).
Permanent Condition
Plaintiff concedes that the water on the floor of Hickory Kist was not a permanent condition, but
contends that the store's method of operation created an inherently dangerous condition that was
foreseeable. Method of operation is analyzed under the permanent condition theory of storeowner
liability in slip-and-fall cases. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531
P2d at 362); Canfield v Albertsons, Inc., 841 P 2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the second theory
of slip-and-fall cases or permanent condition theory governs the case).
Plaintiff argues that De Weese v. J.C. Pennev Company. 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah
1956), and Canfield support her position.
In De Weese. the plaintiff slipped in the entrance of defendant's store. It had been snowing for at
least ten minutes and for up to half an hour before plaintiff entered the store. The floor was wet and
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muddy, and there were no rubber mats or abrasives on the floor. The De Weese coyrt noted that this was
not a temporary condition. The entrance to the store was "terrazzo surfacing'' which was '"part of the
permanent structure of the building/' 297 P.2d at 901. "The evidence clearly showfed] that the
defendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and that it was its custom.,
and the custom of other stores with similar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit to prevent slippenness
during stormy weather." Id. In upholding the jury verdict, the court noted that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that it had been raining for a long enough period of time that defendant
should have employed its safety measures.
In Canfield v Albertsons, the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's grant of
summary j udgment to defendant. Plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce. The heads of lettuce were being
displayed in what is known as a "farmer's pack/' in which the lettuce arrives from the farm without the
damaged leaves being removed. Customers often removed and discarded the leaves from the lettuce
they intended to purchase. Albertsons knew of this problem and placed empty boxes around the display
for customers to discard the leaves and regularly patrolled the area. The Court of Appeals found that
Albertsons chose a method of display where third parties would remove lettuce leaves and discard them.
"It was reasonably foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped
on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id. at 1227.
The Utah Supreme Court in Schnuphase limited the holding and precedential weight of Canfield.
Schnuphase held that "[cjentrai to its finding in Canfield was the court of appeals' determination that
Albertsons had notice of the potentially hazardous condition..." 918 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
Schnuphase ruled that a plaintiff must show that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable, and

expressed concern with extending store owner liability in method of operation cases. See also, Babbitt
v. 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation, 2000 UT App. 50 (not for official
publication) (plaintiff slipped on mayonnaise packet on handicap ramp outside its store).
In the instant case there is no evidence that Hickory Kist chose a method of operation that created
an inherently dangerous condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable. Unlike
the defendant in Canfield. Hickory Kist did not have notice that it had created a potentially hazardous
condition.
CONCLUSION
It is regrettable that Ms. Jex suffered injuries. However, "not ever}' accident that occurs gives
rise to a cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands
of accidents occur everyday for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame."
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479-80, quoting, Martin v. Safewav Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah
1977).
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. The Court requests counsel for Defendant to
prepare an order consistent with this decision.
DATED this 2* -day of May, 2006.
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